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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________________________ 
 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 These appeals, briefed separately but listed together 
for oral argument, both present Commerce Clause challenges to 
municipal "flow control" ordinances.  These ordinances require 
waste haulers, like the plaintiffs in each case here, to bring 
solid waste picked up within the municipal boundaries to 
designated landfill sites located within a state.  These 
designated sites, in turn, usually charge "tipping fees" 
considerably higher than other, non-designated sites located 
nearby in other states.  In each case we must determine whether 
these ordinances, which threaten haulers taking waste to 
nondesignated sites with fines and suspension, impermissibly 
discriminate against interstate commerce.   
 In one case Harvey & Harvey ("Harvey"), an interstate 
collector, hauler and processor of municipal solid waste, brought 
suit against Chester County, the Chester County Solid Waste 
Authority ("the Authority")0 the Southeastern Chester County 
                                                           
0The authority is a Pennsylvania municipal corporation 
established by the County Commissioners in 1984 for the purpose 
of operating the Lanchester Landfill. 
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Refuse Authority ("SECCRA")0 and the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Resources (the "DER").  It seeks to have the 
County's flow control plan declared unconstitutional under the 
dormant Commerce Clause.  The district court denied Harvey's 
motion for a preliminary injunction.  Concluding that the plan 
does not discriminate against interstate commerce, it held that 
the Pike balancing test, see Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 
137, 90 S. Ct. 844 (1970), which Harvey acknowledged that it 
could not meet, would apply.  (Sept. 8, 1994 Order.)  Because the 
district court did not consider whether the Chester County flow 
control scheme offered out-of-state landfill operators an equal 
opportunity to compete for the county's waste disposal business, 
we vacate and remand for further proceedings. 
 In the other case Tri-County Industries, Inc. ("Tri-
County"), a hauler of residential and commercial solid waste 
throughout Mercer County and in other Western Pennsylvania and 
Ohio counties, brought suit against the County of Mercer and the 
Mercer County Solid Waste Authority ("MCSWA").  It sought both a 
declaratory judgment that the county's flow control plan violated 
the dormant Commerce Clause and a permanent injunction enjoining 
its enforcement.  The district court, concluding that the plan 
improperly impeded interstate commerce, granted final judgment on 
stipulated facts in favor of Tri-County.  We hold that the 
district court erred in concentrating on the operation of the 
ordinance and concomitantly in failing to consider whether out-
                                                           
0SECCRA owns the SECCRA landfill. 
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of-state interests competed on a level playing field.  Therefore, 
the order in Tri-County must also be vacated and remanded. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 A.  THE SOLID WASTE CRISIS 
 During the 1970s and '80s, national environmental 
concerns fostered stricter state regulation of waste disposal. 
This regulation led to a large number of landfill closures 
throughout the United States, creating shortages in many places 
and driving up landfill pricing.  See Eric S. Petersen & David N. 
Abramowitz, Municipal Solid Waste Flow in the Post-Carbone World, 
22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 361 n.33 (1995); see also Harvey SA 382 
(Kerns); James C. Vago, Comment, The Uncertain Future of Flow 
Control Ordinances: The Last Trash to Clarkstown?, 22 N. KY. L. 
REV. 93, 98 (1995).  Pennsylvania was no exception.  It too 
experienced inadequate and rapidly diminishing disposal capacity 
for municipal waste.  See 53 P.S. §4000.102(a)(2) (legislative 
findings). 
 Waste disposal methods, ranked in descending order of 
environmental impact, include: source reduction and reuse, waste 
combustion, and landfilling.  See Vago, 22 N. KY. L. REV. at 106. 
Environmentally advanced, innovative waste disposal facilities 
can cost "in the tens to hundreds of millions of dollars to 
construct."  See Vago, 22 N. KY. L. REV. at 108.  State and 
federal environmental mandates often require the use of these 
new, more expensive facilities.  Petersen & Abramowitz, 22 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. at *7 [n.66].  Securing long term access to disposal 
facilities necessary to protect the citizens' health and safety 
7 
"requires long-term commitments, debt and security." Id. [n.66]. 
Methods less protective of the environment generally have lower 
capital and operating costs, and thus can charge a lower tipping 
fee. 
 B.  THE RESPONSE 
 Until the Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed many of the 
tax incentives, most waste disposal facilities were privately 
owned and operated.  ID. at *4 [n.36].  In response to the tax 
changes and increased costs caused by environmental regulation, 
increased public ownership became necessary, shifting the 
financing burden to the local governments.  With this burden came 
risk.  Even where the municipal government contracts with a 
private operator to construct or upgrade the disposal facility, 
the municipality often continues to bear the risk of an 
inadequate waste supply through municipal guarantees. 
Consequently, "it is the ability of local governments to control 
these haulers and where they transport the collected waste that 
often determines the feasibility of the solid waste processing 
disposal programs."  See Petersen & Abramowitz, 22 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. at *2 [n.31]. 
  Flow control ordinances, enacted by a number of states 
attempting to deal with these waste disposal crises, create a 
system in which waste haulers are licensed by the municipality 
and are directed to take the waste collected to landfills that 
have been designated by the county.  By conditioning the haulers' 
licenses on their compliance, local governments can assure a 
certain minimum revenue at the designated sites.  Flow control 
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both guarantees that a certain volume will be deposited and 
enables the operators of the designated landfill to collect a 
"tipping fee"0  high enough to cover the cost of processing. 
Indeed, tipping fees are typically based on both the system's 
construction cost and the estimated amount of waste that will be 
deposited there annually.  In some cases, the municipalities 
actually set the tipping fee contractually. 
 Given the municipalities' reliance on the higher rates 
in effect when the municipalities were constructing and financing 
these facilities, flow control ordinances have been crucial to 
the financial viability of these facilities in the wake of the 
precipitous decline of tipping fees.0  Indeed, flow control has 
"been a vital economic element in supporting dozens of major 
waste-to-energy and landfill-based waste disposal programs 
involving billions of dollars in capital investment."  Petersen & 
Abramowitz, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. at *2 [n.25].0  
                                                           
0The tipping fee is the price charged haulers to dump a ton of 
waste at a landfill. 
0Although the waste disposal crisis had evidenced an acute 
shortage of environmentally sound landfill capacity, the market 
eventually responded to the increased price; in fact, there were 
so many entrants into the waste disposal market, constructing so 
many new facilities, that tipping fees collapsed.  Thus, while 
landfills could contract for tipping fees between $35.00 per ton 
(Mercer County) and $52.00 per ton (Chester County) approximately 
five years ago, current spot rate tipping fees are approximately 
$17.50 - $30.00 per ton. 
0Until C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S.Ct. 1677 
(1994), discussed infra, these ordinances had withstood a variety 
of constitutional challenges, including due process, antitrust, 
and Commerce Clause challenges.  Petersen & Abramowitz, 22 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. at *8-9 [nn.67-110].  Indeed, through the late 1980s, 
federal courts entertaining Commerce Clause challenges to flow 
control found that even flow control schemes involving export 
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 C.  PENNSYLVANIA'S MUNICIPAL WASTE ACT 
 In responding to its own solid waste crisis, the 
Pennsylvania legislature enacted the Municipal Waste Act (the 
"Act") to protect the public health, safety and welfare from the 
short- and long-term dangers of the transportation, processing, 
treatment, storage and disposal of municipal waste.  See 53 P.S. 
§4000.102(b)(3).  The Act establishes a system requiring each 
county to plan for the long-term processing and ultimate disposal 
of its waste.  In authorizing each county to adopt flow control 
ordinances, the Act explicitly set forth the policy goal of such 
flow control legislation: 
Authorizing counties to control the flow of 
municipal waste is necessary, among other 
reasons, to guarantee the long-term economic 
viability of resource recovery facilities and 
municipal waste landfills, to ensure that 
such facilities and landfills can be 
financed, to moderate the cost of such 
facilities and landfills over the long term, 
to protect existing capacity and to assist in 
the development of markets for recyclable 
materials by guaranteeing a steady flow of 
such materials. §102(a)(10). 
  
 Under the Act, counties may designate for a ten-year 
period the facilities at which waste generated within the county 
will be processed or disposed.  See 53 P.S. § 4000.303(e).  Such 
facilities do not have to be located within the county, although 
one provision of the Act states that "[p]roper and adequate 
processing and disposal of municipal waste generated within a 
county requires the generating county to give first choice to new 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
bans had only an incidental burden on commerce, and therefore did 
not discriminate against interstate commerce.  ID. at *9 [n.100]. 
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processing and disposal sites located within that county."  53 
P.S. §4000.102(6).   Each county must consider alternative 
facilities and programs, and "provide reasonable assurances that 
the county utilized a fair, open and competitive process for 
selecting such facilities or programs from among the alternatives 
which were suggested to the county."  53 P.S. §4000.502(f)(2). In 
addition, if a county proposes to own or operate a municipal 
waste processing or disposal facility, it must explain the basis 
for such a proposal, giving consideration to the comprehensive 
costs and benefits of private ownership and operation of such 
facilities.  53 P.S. §4000.502(m). 
 The facilities designated by a county, and the process 
by which they are chosen, must be set out in a municipal waste 
management plan. 53 P.S. §4000.502(f).  During its preparation, 
the plan is reviewed by a county advisory committee made up of 
representatives from the county's municipalities, civic groups, 
and industry.  The committee makes suggestions and proposes any 
changes it believes are appropriate. 53 P.S. §4000.503(a).  At 
least thirty days before submitting any proposed plan revisions 
to the Department of Environmental Resources ("DER"), the county 
must submit a copy of the proposed revision to the County 
Advisory Committee.  53 P.S. § 4000.503(d).  The county must also 
make the plan available for a ninety-day public review and 
comment period, and hold at least one public hearing on the 
proposed plan during this period.  53 P.S. §4000.503(c). 
 After adoption by the county, a plan must undergo a 
municipal ratification process requiring approval by fifty 
11 
percent of the municipalities in the county, representing at 
least fifty percent of the population.  53 P.S. §§4000.503(d); 
504(c).  The plan must then be submitted to the DER for approval, 
after which any party objecting to the plan may appeal to the 
Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board.  If a county chooses to 
require that municipal waste be processed or disposed of at 
designated facilities by means other than contract (e.g., by 
ordinance), the plan must explain the basis for such a proposal 
and include a copy of the proposed flow control ordinance or 
other legal instrument.  53 P.S. § 4000.502(1). 
 The plan, and the list of facilities designated by the 
county for processing and disposal, may be revised by the county 
at any time but must be revised at least three years prior to the 
time that the remaining capacity for a county is exhausted.  25 
Pa. Code § 272.251(b); 25 Pa. Code § 272.251(a)(1). 
 
 D.  THE HARVEY CASE 
  1.  The Chester County Plan 
 Harvey is a Delaware corporation operating in 
Pennsylvania, Maryland and Delaware as an interstate collector, 
hauler and processor, inter alia, of municipal solid waste. 
Harvey is a licensed hauler of municipal solid waste in Chester 
County, Pennsylvania. 
 On May 30, 1989, the Chester County Board of 
Commissioners appointed the Chester County Act 101 Municipal 
Waste Advisory Committee.  The Committee evaluated six potential 
waste management methods in order to select the components that 
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would constitute the Chester County solid waste management 
system:  waste reduction, recycling, waste-to-energy technology, 
a trash-for-ash exchange, transfer stations and landfilling.  In 
addition, the Committee participated in four day-long site 
inspections of existing waste disposal and processing facilities 
located in Baltimore, Maryland and Chester County, Montgomery 
County, Philadelphia, and York, Pennsylvania.  The Committee also 
attended a presentation on the Westinghouse resource recovery 
facility located in the City of Chester, Pennsylvania. 
 The Committee held 13 meetings between July 11, 1989, 
and March 20, 1990, to discuss the elements of the County's waste 
management plan.  Although these meetings were open to the 
public, they were advertised only in the Daily Local News, a 
Westchester paper with a circulation of approximately 45,000.  
The Committee then prepared a draft plan, and on May 29 and May 
31, 1990, conducted public hearings to entertain public comment 
on the draft plan.  The record does not reveal how these public 
meetings were advertised or how many people attended.  The 
Committee approved revisions based on that public comment. Harvey 
did not participate in the process, either as an advocate of an 
alternative site or as a commenter.  The record does not contain 
any explanation for Harvey's absence, but it appears that Harvey 
did not have significant business in the County prior to 1990. 
 The County Commissioners adopted the updated Plan on 
September 25, 1990, and the DER granted its final approval on 
April 11, 1991.  The Plan contained key components of the 
committee's draft plan, including the decision to designate the 
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Southeastern Chester County Refuse Authority Sanitary Landfill 
(the "SECCRA Landfill") and the Chester County Solid Waste 
Authority Lanchester Sanitary Landfill ("Lanchester Landfill") as 
the primary disposal sites for the County.  The County selected 
these two sites from among those considered because "the haulers 
of trash in the County had established a historical pattern of 
disposal at these landfills."  County Br. at 11.  In fact, the 
County had played a role in financing the Lanchester landfill. In 
1984, the County purchased it and turned its operation over to 
the Authority.  The County financed the purchase with $42.55 
million in Authority revenue bonds which carry a County 
guarantee.  After the purchase, the County guaranteed an 
additional $41.5 million in Authority debt, secured a $9.2 
million letter of credit, and agreed to provide the Authority 
with an additional $9.5 million for landfill projects. 
 In response to concerns voiced by Committee members 
that the "northern tier" of the County might be adversely 
affected by the system proposed by the Committee (i.e., 
designating only the SECCRA and Lanchester landfills), the 
Committee voted to recommend that the Pottstown Landfill, a 
privately owned facility located in adjacent Montgomery County, 
be included in the Plan as a disposal option.0   
 Initially, the 1990 Plan did not mandate the adoption 
of flow control.  The DER informed Chester County during its 
                                                           
0The Pottstown facility was approved to receive waste only from 
certain areas within the county, and the amount of waste it could 
receive was capped at the amount deposited by the county at the 
facility in 1989. 
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review process, however, that it would not approve the Plan 
unless the County flow controlled its waste.  DER letters of 
3/12/91; 4/11/91; committee notes.  Consequently, the County 
commissioners enacted a flow control ordinance on April 2, 1992. 
The ordinance divides the County into two service areas: the 
SECCRA Landfill service area and the Lanchester Landfill Service 
Area.  Municipal waste generated in these service areas must be 
disposed of at the facility designated by the County to receive 
the waste.  A certain amount of waste may also be taken to the 
Pottstown landfill.  The terms of the ordinance permit amendment 
to designate other facilities and do not prohibit out-of-state 
facilities from applying.0  However, the indentures of the 
revenue bonds and administrative agreements between the County 
and the Authority stipulate that the County will oppose the 
construction, acquisition, operation or designation of any 
facility that might divert revenue from Lanchester.  (Committee 
letters to DER seeking permission not to consider additional 
sites for designation). 
  2.  Procedural History 
                                                           
0The Ordinance defines a Designated facility as follows: 
 
the Lanchester Sanitary Landfill owned and operated by 
the Chester County Solid Waste Authority, located in 
Honeybrook Township, Chester County and Caernarvon and 
Salisbury Townships, Lancaster County; the Southeastern 
Chester County Refuse Authority Sanitary Landfill, 
located in London Grove Township, Chester County; the 
Pottstown Landfill owned and operated by SCA Services 
of Pennsylvania, Inc., located in West Pottsgrove 
Township, Montgomery County; or any other County 
designated Municipal Waste processing or disposal 
facility. 
15 
 Harvey filed its complaint in the district court on 
June 15, 1994, challenging Chester County's flow control plan 
under the Federal Constitution's Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, 
Cl. 3.  Harvey alleged that the regulations isolate the County 
from the interstate solid waste market by prohibiting the export 
of locally generated waste to out-of-state disposal and by 
similarly prohibiting the import of waste processing and disposal 
services from out of state.  On June 27, 1994, Harvey moved for a 
preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the relevant 
regulations adopted pursuant to the ordinance.  After a hearing, 
the district court denied the motion on the grounds that Harvey 
had made an insufficient showing of immediate and irreparable 
harm.  A trial date was set for September 12, 1994. 
 Prior to trial, the parties filed cross motions to 
determine the standard of review and, thus, who would bear the 
burden of proof.  The district court granted the defendants' 
motion to apply the Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 90 
S. Ct. 844 (1970) balancing test since it found that the Chester 
County Ordinance did not discriminate on its face or in purpose 
or effect against interstate commerce.  September 8, 1994 Order. 
Harvey conceded that it could not prove its case under the Pike 
standard and therefore stipulated to an order of final judgment 
Harvey appealed. 
  E.  THE TRI-COUNTY CASE 
  1.  The Mercer County Plan 
 Plaintiff/appellant, Tri-County Industries, Inc., is a 
Pennsylvania corporation doing business in Mercer County, 
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Pennsylvania.  In late 1989, the Mercer County Commissioners 
formed the Mercer County Solid Waste Authority ("MCSWA") to 
implement the County's duties under the Act.  Mercer County 
generates approximately 5,000 tons of municipal waste each month. 
 After retaining the services of an independent 
consultant, Mercer County decided that the best solution for this 
fairly small county would be to contract with a single disposal 
facility.  The County prepared detailed bid specifications for 
the needed municipal waste capacity.  The Request for Proposals 
("RFP") was advertised nationwide and was obtained by twenty-
three companies around the country.  Although many of these 
companies were located in Pennsylvania, others were located in 
Ohio, New York, Maryland, New Jersey, Minnesota and Louisiana. 
Only four companies, including the appellee, Tri-County, 
submitted a bid in response to the RFP, and none of these was 
from outside Pennsylvania.  The successful bidder was Waste 
Management of Pennsylvania, the owner of a landfill in Butler 
County. 
 By its terms the process outlined by Mercer County in 
its RFPs does not discriminate against in- or out-of-state 
interests.  The RFP requirements apply equally to all disposal 
facilities, irrespective of their location.  Id, see also RFP 
1.4(g).  The plan was submitted to DER in the fall of 1990 and 
approved in March, 1991.  After DER approved the Plan, MCSWA 
contracted with the successful bidder, and Mercer County adopted 
the now contested Ordinance, No. 6-1991.  The ordinance requires 
each hauler in the county to obtain a license and to haul 
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municipal waste generated in the county to the landfill 
designated in the county plan "as it may be revised from time to 
time."  Section 3, 6-1991. 
 Although the Plan required Tri-County to haul the waste 
to the Butler facility and pay the $35 per ton tipping fee, Tri-
County in fact took some of its waste to two other facilities in 
Ohio which charged tipping fees of only $17.20 and $27.95 per 
ton.  Of the approximately 600 to 900 tons of waste Tri-county 
hauled monthly, it took 500 tons per month to the non-designated, 
Ohio facilities.  The MCSWA notified Tri-County by letter dated 
March 19, 1993, that it would hold a hearing on April 15, 1993, 
to determine whether Tri-county's waste hauling license should be 
revoked for its failure to deliver all of its waste to the 
designated facility. 
  2.  Procedural History 
 In response to this notice of hearing, Tri-County filed 
this declaratory judgment action in the district court seeking a 
declaration that the ordinance violated the Commerce Clause, and 
a permanent injunction enjoining its enforcement.  It also moved 
for a preliminary injunction, and the district court held 
hearings on that motion, which the court then denied.  After some 
discovery, the parties filed a joint stipulation of fact and a 
joint motion to enter judgment on the basis of the evidence 
before the district court. 
 In October 1994, the district court entered judgment 
for Tri-County on the grounds that the ordinance, by requiring 
that all waste generated within the county be taken to the 
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designated landfill in Butler County, operated to impermissibly 
burden interstate commerce.  This appeal followed. 
 Both of these appeals involve the district courts' 
choice of the applicable legal standard.  Since this involves the 
selection, interpretation and application of legal precepts, our 
review is plenary.  See Doe v. American Red Cross, 14 F.3d 196 
(3d Cir. 1993). 
II.  THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 A.  THE GENERAL COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
 The Commerce Clause provides that "[t]he Congress shall 
have Power . . . to regulate Commerce . . . among the several 
States." U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  "Although the Clause 
speaks in terms of powers bestowed upon Congress, the Court has 
long recognized that it also limits the power of the States to 
erect barriers against interstate trade."  Lewis v. B.T. 
Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35, 100 S. Ct. 2009, 2015 
(1980).  That is, the Commerce Clause has a negative or dormant 
aspect which limits state authority to regulate areas where 
"Congress has not affirmatively acted to either authorize or 
forbid the challenged state activity."  Atlantic Coast Demolition 
& Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Atlantic 
County, 48 F.3d 701, 710 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Norfolk Southern 
Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 392 (3d Cir. 1987)).  None of the 
parties has argued that Congress has either prohibited or 
authorized the flow control ordinances at issue here.0 
                                                           
0As with any dormant commerce clause issue, "[i]t is well 
established that Congress may authorize the States to engage in 
19 
Consequently, we must consider whether these ordinances violate 
the dormant Commerce Clause. 
 In considering Commerce Clause challenges, courts 
should "'determine whether action taken by state or local 
authorities unduly threatens the values the Commerce Clause was 
intended to serve.'"  Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 
388, 399 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida 
Dept. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2369, 2372-73 (1986)). 
"[T]he Commerce Clause is designed to eliminate protectionist 
restrictions on interstate trade which typically characterize 
international trade, such as embargoes, quotas, and tariffs." 
Oberly, 822 F.2d at 399; see also New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 
U.S. 269, 273 (1988) (explaining purpose of the clause as 
prohibiting "economic protectionism -- that is, regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
regulation that the Commerce Clause would otherwise forbid."  See 
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138, 106 S. Ct. 2440, 2447 (1986). 
Congress can in effect overturn a Supreme Court decision simply 
by explicitly giving the states the authority to regulate.  In 
her concurrence in Carbone, Justice O'Connor considered whether 
Congress' passage of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 6941 et seq.,  constituted such an 
authorization.  Although she conceded that the statute (in 
conjunction with its legislative history) could be read to 
empower states to adopt flow control ordinances, she maintained 
that, in order to authorize potentially discriminatory state 
regulation, Congress must speak explicitly and unmistakably. 
Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1691-92.  Because RCRA did not constitute 
such an explicit pronouncement, she concluded that RCRA could not 
serve as the necessary enactment.  In the wake of Carbone, 
Congress has considered legislation providing for such explicit 
authorization of flow control schemes.  Although the Senate 
passed the bill known as the Interstate Transportation of 
Municipal Solid Waste Act of 1995, S.534, see 141 Cong. Rec. 
S.6728, which would have grandfathered many of the flow control 
ordinances enacted to finance existing facilities, the bill has 
not passed the House.  Thus, we must consider whether the 
ordinances involve here survive the Carbone test. 
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measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by 
burdening out-of-state competitors").  Because of that animating 
purpose, the Court has applied a two-step inquiry to determine 
whether a challenged ordinance or regulation violates the 
Commerce Clause. 
 The first step involves determining whether the 
ordinance discriminates against interstate commerce; 
discrimination is defined as the  "differential treatment of in-
state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the 
former and burdens the latter."  Oregon Waste Syst. Inc. v. Dept. 
of Environmental Quality of Oregon, 114 S.Ct. 1360 (1994).  If "a 
state law is shown to discriminate against interstate commerce 
'either on its face or in practical effect,' the burden falls on 
the State to demonstrate both that the statute 'serves a 
legitimate local purpose,' and that this purpose could not be 
served as well by available nondiscriminatory means."  Maine v. 
Taylor, 106 S. Ct 2440, 2447 (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 
at 336, 99 S. Ct. at 1736); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. 
Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928). 
 But if the ordinance does not discriminate against 
interstate commerce either in purpose or effect, it is subjected 
to a balancing test whereby the statute will be upheld unless 
"the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits."  Pike v. Bruce Church 
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).  For instance, in Minnesota v. 
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 101 S. Ct. 715 (1981), 
the Court upheld a Minnesota statute that banned the retail sale 
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of milk in plastic jugs.  Because the statute imposed burdens on 
both in-state and out-of-state dairies, it was subjected only to 
the Pike balancing test.  After determining which standard to 
apply, courts must then determine whether the statute can meet 
the test enunciated under the appropriate standards. 
  1.   Triggering Strict Scrutiny:  Discriminatory  
  Purpose or Effect 
 
 A regulation serving a protectionist purpose is 
obviously invalid since a discriminatory purpose is a fortiori 
illegitimate.  See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at 624, 
98 S. Ct. at 2535 (characterizing a statute with a protectionist 
purpose as virtually per se invalid).  More benign purposes, 
however, do not immunize the statute from the challenge since 
"the evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means as 
well as legislative ends." Id. at 626, 2536; see also Fort 
Gratiot Landfill v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources, 112 
S. Ct. 2019, 2024 (1992) (invalidating legislation with 
legitimate goals since even valid purposes may not be 
accomplished "by the illegitimate means of isolating [the county] 
from the national economy").   
 If a statute's purpose is not manifestly 
discriminatory, the court must determine "how directly [the 
statute] burdens interstate commerce and how evenhandedly it 
impacts interstate and intrastate commerce."  Stephen D. DeVito, 
Jr. Trucking v. RISWMC, 770 F. Supp. 775, 781 (D.R.I. 1991); see 
also Carbone, 104 S. Ct. at 1684 (courts look beyond explicit 
terms of statute to examine its practical purpose or effect); 
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Hughes, 441 U.S. at 336, 99 S. Ct. at 1736; Taylor, 477 U.S. at 
138, 106 S. Ct. at 2447; Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2023-25 
(either purpose or effect can trigger strict scrutiny); Norfolk 
S. Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 406 (3d Cir. 1987).  This court 
has expressed some doubt whether a showing of discriminatory 
effect alone could suffice.  See Oberly, 822 F.2d at 400-01 n.18. 
But Carbone and the entire line of recent Supreme Court cases 
have clarified that either purpose or effect will trigger strict 
scrutiny analysis.  We also note that where the showing of effect 
is weak, demonstrating discriminatory purpose buttresses the 
case. 
 As we explained, the purpose of the dormant Commerce 
Clause is to prevent "[s]tate and local governments [from using] 
their regulatory power to favor local enterprise by prohibiting 
patronage of out-of-state competitors or their facilities." 
Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1684; see also H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. 
Du Mond, 336 U.S. at 537-38 ("What is ultimate is the principle 
that one state in its dealings with another may not place itself 
in a position of economic isolation.").  The purpose of the 
dormant Commerce Clause is not to protect individual firms.  In 
Exxon Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 126, 98 S. Ct. 2207, 2214 
(1978), the Supreme Court upheld a statute prohibiting a 
petroleum producer or refiner from operating retail service 
stations within the state.  The Court explained:   
While the refiners will no longer enjoy their 
same status in the Maryland market, in-state 
independent dealers will have no competitive 
advantage over out-of-state dealers. The fact 
that the burden of a state regulation falls 
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on some interstate companies does not, by 
itself, establish a claim of discrimination 
against interstate commerce.  
 
Id. at 2214.  Conversely, the one-time selection of an in-state 
interest does not by itself establish a discriminatory effect 
unless the selection confers an unreasonably long-term benefit. 
 This Court has recently rejected attempts to 
characterize all legislative schemes which award business to a 
successful bidder as Commerce Clause violations.  Atlantic Coast, 
48 F.3d at 714-15.  Although we recognized that regulations of 
public utilities (including those that require the utility to 
secure its capacity within the state) are now subject to the same 
Commerce Clause scrutiny as non-utility statutes, we found 
significant precedent for local government authorities to select 
a single service provider in the public utility context: 
A gas or electric utility granted a franchise 
to serve the needs of all residents within a 
local area is not ordinarily required to 
commit to producing its electricity or 
securing its natural gas supply within that 
area as well.  Normally, both in-state and 
out-of-state interests  may, therefore, 
compete equally for the franchise award and 
the creation of a captive consumer base does 
not, under these circumstances, discriminate 
against electricity and gas generated or 
produced out of state.  
 
48 F.3d at 715. 
 Carbone explicitly rejected the argument that a 
disputed statute would have to favor all in-state businesses as a 
group -- a statute may be invalid if it favors only a single or 
finite set of businesses.  114 S. Ct. at 1682-83.  Consequently, 
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where a challenge is based on the alleged favoritism of a finite 
set of in-state interests (rather than all in-state businesses), 
it must be demonstrated that the ordinance actually favors the 
chosen in-state providers.  That the ordinance requires the use 
of the selected facility, thus prohibiting the use of non-
designated facilities (which may be out of state), does not 
itself establish a Commerce Clause violation. 
 B.  THE SOLID WASTE COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE 
The Early Cases 
 The Supreme Court first recognized that the interstate 
hauling of solid waste was commerce for the purposes of Commerce 
Clause analysis in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 
617 (1978).  In that case, the Court struck down a New Jersey 
ordinance that prohibited the importation of solid or liquid 
waste that originated out-of-state.  While New Jersey could 
pursue its goal of restricting access to its diminishing waste 
disposal facilities, it could not do so by blocking only out-of-
state waste. Id. at 626-27.  The Court explained that such a 
clear example of purposeful economic protectionism -- a virtual 
import ban -- is subject to a per se rule of invalidity.  Id. at 
625.   
 Despite the solid waste disposal crisis of the 1980s, 
the Supreme Court has invalidated each of the ordinances that 
attempted to ban or to levy differential surcharges on waste 
generated out-of-state.  See, e.g., Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 
2019 (1992) (invalidating regulation prohibiting out-of state 
waste in the landfill unless authorized by Congress); Oregon 
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Waste Sys. Inc. v. Dept. of Environmental Quality of Oregon, 114 
S. Ct. 1346 (1994) (voiding differential charge); Chemical Waste 
Management Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992) (same).  
  In response to these successful constitutional 
challenges, municipalities sought other means of managing solid 
waste disposal.  Instead of attempting to limit the quantity of 
waste by banning or discouraging the importation of out-of-state 
waste, local governments opted to expand the capacity of their 
waste disposal facilities.  They obtained the financing for these 
expansions by adopting flow control ordinances, which were 
necessary to reassure the bondholders (and the underwriters). 
Dormant Commerce Clause challenges to these statutes ensued. 
 C. CARBONE 
 In C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 114 S. 
Ct. 1677 (1994), the Supreme Court transposed its skepticism of 
waste control initiatives to flow control ordinances.  Reversing 
the decision of an intermediate appellate court, the Court struck 
down Clarkstown's law requiring all nonhazardous solid waste 
within the town, whether or not generated in the town, to be 
deposited at a town-designated transfer station.  The town had 
arranged with a private contractor to construct the designated 
site (which was within the town, and perforce in-state) in return 
for the town's commitment to deliver and pay for the processing 
of at least 120,000 tons of solid waste annually.  At the end of 
a five year period, the town could purchase the facility for one 
dollar.  Because the town's guaranteed tipping fee was higher 
than the cost on the private market, the town needed to adopt the 
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flow control ordinance to obtain the fee from the haulers and to 
minimize its own obligations under the guarantee agreement. 
 The Court found that Clarkstown's ordinance 
discriminated against interstate commerce by bestowing a favored 
status on the single waste processor within the town and by 
"depriving competitors, including out-of-state firms, of access 
to a local market," 114 S. Ct. at 1680.  The Court was 
unpersuaded by the argument that the ordinance did not 
discriminate because it applied equally to in-state and out-of-
state haulers.  Id. at 1682 (citing Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 71 
S. Ct. 295 (1951); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. 
Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019, 2024 
(1992)).  Instead, the Court regarded Clarkstown's ordinance as 
"just one more instance of local processing requirements" that 
the Court has long held invalid.  Id. at 1682-83 (citing cases 
involving statutes that required various articles of commerce to 
be processed within their state of origin).  The Clarkstown 
statute fit this mold since its terms explicitly required "all 
solid waste within or generated within the Town of Clarkstown . . 
. [to be] delivered to the Town of Clarkstown solid waste 
facility at Route 303, West Nyack, New York and such other sites, 
situated in the Town."  Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1685 app.  The 
statute did not mention any possibility of adding additional or 
alternative sites. 
 Because the single site designated by the ordinance was 
in state, the Court presumed that Clarkstown's ordinance had the 
"design and effect" of hoarding a local resource.  Id. at 1683. 
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That Clarkstown intended the scheme to serve as a financing 
measure imparted it with a discriminatory purpose, according to 
the Court.  114 S. Ct. at 1684.  Although the majority rejected 
Justice O'Connor's view that, to be discriminatory, a law must 
discriminate against out-of-state interests as a group, the Court 
still required that the law discriminate in favor of an in-state 
interest.  114 S. Ct. at 1682-83.  Moreover, the Clarkstown 
ordinance did not provide for amendment to add other, perhaps 
out-of-state sites, and did not limit the period of the 
designation. Indeed, the town's likely ownership of the transfer 
station after five years seems to render the station's monopoly 
permanent. 
 Since Carbone, flow control ordinances have been 
subjected to searching Commerce Clause scrutiny.  Some 
commentators have characterized the language of the Carbone 
opinion as exceptionally broad, and acknowledged that the 
decision places the "painstakingly privatized waste disposal 
systems" in jeopardy by denying the municipalities the principal 
means of support they have used to finance such facilities. 
Petersen & Abramowitz, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. at *15 [n.170]; see 
also Vago, The Uncertain Future of Flow Control Ordinances, 22 N. 
KY. L. REV. at 105, 107 (citing examples of endangered 
facilities); and 109 (describing impracticality of Court's 
municipal bond suggestion).  While Carbone undisputedly sweeps 
quite broadly, we do not read it to establish a per se rule 
subjecting all flow control ordinances to strict scrutiny. 
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Whether strict scrutiny applies is crucial because its 
application is usually fatal to a challenged regulation. 
 D. ATLANTIC COAST 
 We applied Carbone in Atlantic Coast Demolition & 
Recycling, Inc. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Atlantic 
County, 48 F.3d 701 (3d Cir. 1995).   Atlantic Coast involved a 
challenge to New Jersey's solid waste management regime, which 
was adopted in response to that state's especially severe solid 
waste crisis during the 1970s and '80s.  Provisions of the Solid 
Waste Management Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. §13:1E-1 to -207 (West 1991 
& supp. 1994), and the Solid Waste Utility Control Act, N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 48:13A-1 to 13 (West Supp. 1994), authorized the 
local waste districts to adopt flow control ordinances mandating 
the delivery of certain wastes to designated facilities that 
charge higher tipping fees in order to cover operating expenses 
and repay revenue bonds used to finance the capital expenditures 
of constructing these facilities. 
 In addressing the challenge, we rejected the attempt to 
frame the issue as one of the constitutionality of the statute 
after the designation was made, thus refuting the contention that 
the challenged ordinance, which required waste to be deposited at 
the designated facility (which was in-state), amounted to an 
export ban.  We found significant precedent allowing local 
government authorities to select a single service provider in the 
public utility context: 
A gas or electric utility granted a franchise 
to serve the needs of all residents within a 
local area is not ordinarily required to 
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commit to producing its electricity or 
securing its natural gas supply within that 
area as well.  Normally, both in-state and 
out-of-state interests may, therefore, 
compete equally for the franchise award and 
the creation of a captive consumer base does 
not, under these circumstances, discriminate 
against electricity and gas generated or 
produced out of state.  
 
48 F.3d at 715. 
 Nevertheless, in Atlantic Coast there were strong 
indications that in-state and out-of-state businesses did not 
compete equally.  The designation process set forth in the 
state's regulations under SWUCA and SWMA, N.J. Admin. Cod tit. 7, 
§26-6.6, allowed for the designation of facilities in the waste 
district, in another waste district or out-of-state.  The state's 
Department of Environmental Protection and Energy ("D.E.P.E.") 
admitted, however, that its goal was to secure the state's self 
sufficiency in non-recyclable waste disposal.  Moreover, a 
district wishing to designate an out-of-state facility had to 
certify to the Department that there were no suitable 
alternatives within the state, either in their waste district or 
in another waste district.  See N.J. Stat Ann. §13:1E-21 (1991). 
Accordingly, the district court found that it was "clear that the 
D.E.P.E. administers the law with the specific goal that all 
waste generated New Jersey be disposed of within the borders of 
the state."  (Civ. No. 93-cv-02669) (JEI).   
 Rather than representing a truly open and competitive 
process, we found that New Jersey "designation process is 
intended to favor operators that have facilities already located 
30 
within, or those that are willing to construct a facility within, 
the state." 48 F.3d at 708.  Indeed, in rejecting the argument 
that out-of-state businesses could compete for designation, we 
explained that the New Jersey regime, with its "core" goal of New 
Jersey's waste self-sufficiency in five years, assured that "out 
of state facilities do not compete on anything approaching a 
level playing field." 48 F.3d at 713.  In interpreting Carbone, 
therefore, Atlantic Coast did not consider all flow control 
ordinances to be per se discriminatory (and consequently subject 
to strict scrutiny analysis).  Instead, we focused on the 
process, and invalidated a scheme in which the process 
discriminated against out-of-state facilities. 
 E.  OTHER CIRCUITS 
 Other circuits applying Carbone have upheld flow 
control ordinances. The Tenth Circuit held that an Oklahoma 
county's scheme requiring operators of industrial waste disposal 
sites to obtain conditional use permits did not discriminate 
against interstate commerce.  See Blue Circle Cement v. Board of 
County Comm'rs, 27 F.3d 1499, 1512 (10th Cir. 1994) (remanding 
for the application of the Pike test).  The ordinance did not 
discriminate against the out-of-state plaintiff seeking to 
operate a hazardous waste fuel (HWF) conversion facility since 
"[i]ts site conditions apply equally, regardless of the origin of 
the HWF's being burned and it confers no advantages on in-state 
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entities seeking to store, treat, recycle, or dispose of HWFs as 
against out-of-state firms."  Id. at 1512.0 
  F.  SUMMARY OF APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES 
 From our review of the caselaw, we derive the following 
relevant principles.  Local government acts that categorically 
favor all in-state providers clearly violate the dormant Commerce 
Clause.  Acts that concentrate waste hauling or processing 
business in the hands of a single or finite set of in-state 
providers are also suspect from a dormant Commerce Clause 
perspective.  Although such regulations ultimately prohibit the 
transport of solid waste to nondesignated sites -- which, in 
these cases, amounts to a prohibition on the export of waste to 
other states -- the fact that the designated sites happened to be 
in-state does not, standing alone, establish that the flow 
control schemes discriminate against interstate commerce.  To 
determine whether these flow control schemes actually 
discriminate against interstate commerce (triggering strict 
scrutiny analysis) the court must closely examine: (1) the 
designation process; (2) the duration of the designation; and (3) 
the likelihood of an amendment to add alternative sites, for 
signs that out-of-state bidders do not in practice enjoy equal 
access to the local market. 
                                                           
0In Kleenwell Biohazard Waste v. Nelson, 48 F.3d 391, 398 (9th 
Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit held that Washington's scheme 
requiring solid waste haulers to obtain certification from a 
state commission did not discriminate against out-of-state 
interests.  The Washington scheme did not, however, designate a 
landfill or require that certified haulers use a particular 
facility and thus did not present the same issue we confront 
today. 
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 These precepts are fully consistent with the precedents 
in this area.  While Carbone clearly has broad application, it 
did not establish a per se rule subjecting all flow control 
ordinances to strict scrutiny.  The Court's discussion reveals 
that its decision was not based on the fact that waste was 
required to be processed at a single plant.  Instead, the Court 
regarded Clarkstown's ordinance as "just one more instance of 
local processing requirements" that the Court has long held 
invalid.  Id. at 1682-83 (citing cases involving statutes that 
required various articles of commerce to be processed within 
their state of origin).  And in interpreting Carbone, this Court 
has focused on the process of selecting waste service providers 
rather than on the effect of the regulation once a provider or 
providers have been chosen.  See Atlantic Coast, 48 F.3d at 713. 
That a flow control ordinance requires all waste to be processed 
or deposited in state for some fixed period of time, therefore, 
does not necessarily violate the dormant Commerce Clause unless 
out-of-state businesses did not compete on an even playing field 
for the designation.  If it were the designation of a single site 
that offended the Commerce Clause, then a scheme "hoarding 
business" for an out-of-state interest would be invalid even 
though the scheme in no way advanced a protectionist purpose or 
effect. 
 While the process in Atantic Coast clearly favored in 
state bidders, not every process used to select a single provider 
is necessarily infected with this same parochialism.  We believe, 
in fact, that a local authority could choose a single provider --
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without impermissibly discriminating against inter-state commerce 
-- so long as the selection process was open and competitive and 
offered truly equal opportunities to in- and out-of-state 
businesses.  See discussion of Exxon and Atlantic Coast, supra at 
24 & 30-31. 
 The burden of showing that the statute discriminates 
rests on the party challenging the statute.  See, e.g., Hughes v. 
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) ("The burden to show 
discrimination rests on the party challenging the validity of the 
statute . . . ."); J. Filiberto Sanitation, Inc. v. Dept. of 
Environmental Protection, 857 F.2d 913, 919 (3d Cir. 1988) ("As 
the party attacking the statute, Filiberto bears the burden of 
showing discrimination").  To make this showing, a plaintiff 
challenging a designation scheme like the one at issue here must 
show that the designation process favors, either purposely or in 
effect, in-state sites.  We recognize the difficulties of 
ascertaining whether long-term designations are really necessary, 
and whether the selection criteria are truly objective.  Courts 
considering flow control schemes where only in-state facilities 
are designated must therefore keep this difficulty in mind when 
scrutinizing the allegedly discriminatory criteria proffered by 
challengers.  Admittedly, we cannot cite any authority for the 
sort of inquiry we will describe, but this area of law is 
nascent, and we are constrained to draw upon notions of 
reasonableness to effectuate the relevant policies. 
 As discrimination may reside in either purpose or 
effect, a number of things can demonstrate that the designation 
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process impermissibly favored in-state interests/bidders. 
Certainly, there could be direct evidence of favoritism, as there 
was in Atlantic Coast, or corrupt payments.  Or a seemingly 
neutral bid specification with an entirely legitimate purpose, 
such as a specified proximity requirement, may have the effect of 
giving in-state interests an advantage.  For instance, the 
incentive to protect a municipal investment, exemplified by the 
attempt in Carbone to minimize the town's exposure under the 
guarantee agreement, would impermissibly skew the process against 
a new -- potentially out-of-state -- provider attempting to gain 
designation in order to compete with an existing in-state 
facility. 
  Moreover, there may be aspects of a flow control regime 
that appear to be so unnecessarily restrictive that a factfinder 
reasonably could conclude that their real purpose was to entrench 
the local interest once selected by a neutral designation 
process.  Examples of such regulations are excessively long 
periods of exclusive service rights under the designation, or an 
absence of any allowance or the absence of any real possibility 
for the designation of additional, potentially out-of-state 
sites.0 
                                                           
0There are, of course, others.  While we are reluctant to pass on 
the reasonableness of the long-term tipping fees contracted for 
by some municipalities implementing flow control, there may be 
cases where the contractual fee is so much higher than both the 
spot rate and the rates prevailing at the time of contract that 
one could conclude that the designation was being used as a 
vehicle to deliver an extraordinary profit to a favored facility. 
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 The governmental defendants can rebut a putative 
showing of discrimination by presenting evidence demonstrating 
that the designation process was open, fair, and competitive, 
i.e., determined by objective criteria which do not have the 
effect of favoring in-state interests.  Courts should require 
that government defendants produce substantial evidence in order 
to rebut the plaintiff's showing.  Such evidence might include 
bid solicitation, selection criteria, evaluation of bidders, et 
alia, but such evidence alone may be insufficient to prove the 
flow control scheme's neutrality.  The government defendants in 
these cases might also present additional evidence, such as 
statistical evidence or expert testimony, demonstrating that 
different aspects of the designation process are as neutral to 
out-of-state interests in practice as they appear on their face. 
Municipalities that have adopted flow control schemes would also 
be wise to demonstrate that the goals of the designation process 
included capacity assurance and the protection of the public 
health and safety. 
 If the government defendant cannot satisfactorily 
demonstrate that the ordinance does not have the purpose or 
effect of discriminating against interstate commerce, it must 
then prove that the ordinance survives strict scrutiny analysis 
(in order to have the ordinance upheld).  This comports with 
other dormant Commerce Clause contexts where, once a plaintiff 
has shown that a law or regulation discriminates against 
interstate commerce, "the burden falls on the State to 
demonstrate both that the statute 'serves a legitimate local 
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purpose,' and that this purpose could not be served as well by 
available nondiscriminatory means."  Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. at 
138, 106 S. Ct. at 2447 (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 
322, 336, 99 S. Ct. 1727, 1736 (1979).  Of course, if the 
defendants succeed in the first showing, then the ordinance would 
be subject only to the Pike balancing test under which the 
plaintiff must prove that "the burden imposed on such commerce is 
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." 
See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142, 90 S. Ct. at 847.0 
V.  APPLICATION TO THESE CASES 
 A.  HARVEY 
 In granting judgment for Chester County, the district 
court determined that the Ordinance "does not discriminate on its 
face nor is the primary purpose or effect" to discriminate.  The 
court, however, demanded too much, for in order to find a dormant 
Commerce Clause violation there is no requirement that 
discrimination must be the "primary" purpose or effect.  This 
erroneous legal conclusion would alone mandate that we set aside 
the judgment and remand for consideration under the proper legal 
standard.  Moreover, the current record creates the strong 
impression that the Chester County process was not sufficiently 
open, and that there was no real potential for amendment that 
                                                           
0We assume that these flow control ordinances will always have a 
sufficient effect on interstate commerce to warrant at least some 
Commerce Clause scrutiny. 
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could offer out-of-state bidders a fair chance at Chester 
County's business.0 
 In combination, Pennsylvania's Act 101 and the Chester 
County ordinance require that waste from within Chester County be 
disposed of at one of the County's designated sites, all of which 
are located within the Commonwealth.  Harvey contends that, 
because the County's Plan, adopted pursuant to the flow control 
ordinance, specifies only the Lanchester, SECCRA, and Pottstown 
facilities, the entire flow control scheme facially discriminates 
against inter-state commerce.  We disagree.  As in the public 
utility context described supra, local governments have the 
capacity, in the practical exercise of their police powers, which 
are at their strongest in the health and safety area, to contract 
with specific businesses to provide certain services. 
Furthermore, to accept Harvey's contention that a plan 
designating in-state sites facially discriminates against 
interstate commerce would require a local government to select 
out-of-state sites, irrespective of their merits, in order to 
withstand Commerce Clause scrutiny.  This result plainly cannot 
prevail. 
                                                           
0We have considered the joint motion of defendants (Chester 
County, the Authority, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the 
DER) to strike portions of appellant's opening brief and 
appendix.  Essentially, the defendants argue that Harvey has 
relied on different excerpts from various depositions, agreements 
and exhibits than it did in the district court.  But because the 
parts, albeit different parts, of the disputed materials were 
submitted to the district court, the materials were incorporated 
by reference into the record in their entirety.  Thus, the Motion 
will be denied.  
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 Also contrary to Harvey's assertions, this case does 
not resemble those cases involving export or import bans (we will 
refer to the alleged violation here as a ban on the importation 
of waste disposal site services) since those cases explicitly 
banned out-of-state interests from participating in the local 
market because they were from outside the state.  See, e.g., 
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624; Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2024. 
We do not mean to suggest that the ordinance must have the 
purpose of discriminating against inter-state commerce, for it is 
well settled that ordinances which have the effect of 
discriminating also violate the Commerce Clause.  See Carbone, 
114 S.Ct at 1684; Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2023-25.  But if 
effects are the purported basis for unconstitutionality, the 
statute must have the consistent effect or the inherent bias of 
favoring one or more in-state interests. 
 Harvey might still prevail if it can demonstrate that 
the Act or the Ordinance discriminates through some aspect of the 
selection process which favors in-state bidders for the 
designation because they are local facilities.  Although Act 101 
does not require flow control ordinances, it does offer 
guidelines to those localities which adopt them.  We will 
therefore examine both the Act and Chester's Plan, as implemented 
by its ordinances. 
  1.  Act 101 
 The Act does not mandate flow control ordinances; it 
only authorizes counties to adopt them. SA 385; §303(a)-(e). One 
of the County's witnesses claimed that Pennsylvania's Act 101 
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directs the county to use a fair, open and competitive process to 
select its providers, see 53 P.S. §4000.502(f)(2) (requiring plan 
to describe alternative facilities considered and "provide 
reasonable assurances that the county utilized a fair, open and 
competitive process for selecting such facilities or programs 
from among alternatives"); 53 P.S. §4000.503(c) (requiring the 
county to make the plan available for a 90-day public review 
period and hold at least one public hearing on the proposed 
plan); 53 P.S. §4000.502(d) (providing that when additional 
disposal capacity is needed, "the county shall give public notice 
of such a determination and solicit proposals and recommendations 
regarding facilities and programs to provide such capacity").    
 While these provisions of the Act suggest an open 
process, other provisions do not seem so neutral.  One provision, 
for example, provides that "[p]roper and adequate processing and 
disposal of municipal waste generated within a county requires 
the generating county to give first choice to new processing and 
disposal sites located within that county."  53 P.S. 
§4000.102(6).  Another provision states that County waste 
management plans "shall identify the general location within a 
county where each municipal waste processing or disposal facility 
. . . will be located and . . . explain how the site will be 
chosen.  For any facility that is proposed to be located outside 
the county, the plan shall explain in detail the reasons for 
selecting such a facility."  53 P.S. §4000.502(g) (emphasis 
added).  By imposing an incremental administrative burden on 
counties attempting to designate a facility outside its borders, 
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these provisions clearly express a preference that counties use 
sites within their borders.  While not as strong an expression of 
favoritism, the Act's preference for in-county sites resembles 
the policies we found offensive in Atlantic Coast.   
 Although Pennsylvania's policy preferences evidence 
some intent to favor in-state sites, Harvey did not attack the 
Act directly and did not rely upon any of these passages of the 
Act.  With the provisions nonetheless in mind, we will therefore 
proceed to examine the County's implementation of the waste 
disposal planning mandate to determine whether Chester County 
officials in fact favored sites within the county. 
  2.  The Plan 
 We do not doubt that the county's legitimate intention 
to comply with the Act0 motivated its adoption of flow control. 
But legitimacy of purpose generally does not end our inquiry.  If 
the manner in which the county implemented its flow control 
system, particularly the process used to designate the ten year 
providers, favored in-county interests, then the flow control 
ordinance has the effect of discriminating against interstate 
commerce and must be subject to the strict scrutiny test 
enunciated in Taylor and Philadelphia. 
 Chester County does indeed appear to have favored in-
county interests.  It is true that one cannot draw any inferences 
about the equity of the designation process from its description 
                                                           
0There are indications that the state authority, the DER, was 
going to withhold approval of the plan unless it included flow 
control. SA331. 
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in the Chester ordinance.  Section 2 of the ordinance originally 
defined "designated facilities" as "those processing or disposal 
facilities designated by resolution of the Chester County Board 
of Commissioners adopted in accordance with the Plan." (SA 252). 
The lateear whether the Committee actually considered designating 
those sites or whether it was simply investigating an alternative 
method of waste disposal.  If the Committee never considered 
designating those sitesy."   
 Other provisions of the Plan, however, do reveal a bias 
for designating in-county sites.  For instance, the Plan provides 
that "The County will consider developing an in-County resource 
recovery facility" (emphasis added), if in-County landfill 
capacity becomes unavailable, or if the County cannot secure 
sufficient capacity outside the county.  These particular 
provisions of the Plan reveal that the Committee intended to keep 
the waste disposal business within the County. 
 Although the county was not favoring all in-County 
sites simply because they were in state (thus not favoring in-
County sites as a group), this does not preclude a finding of 
impermissible discrimination.  Establishing discrimination 
requires only a demonstration that out-of-state interests did not 
compete for designation on a level playing field.   We believe 
that the County's economic interest in keeping the business at 
home and the Plan's legislative history, see, e.g., A135, suggest 
that the designation process did not offer a level playing 
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field.0  That the county sought only to provide environmentally 
safe waste disposal capacity, a legitimate exercise of its police 
powers, would not save the Plan: as we have explained, "the evil 
of protectionism can reside in legislative means as well as 
legislative ends."  Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627. 
   a. Designation 
 Harvey claims that, in preparing the Plan, "the County 
never considered any out-of-state landfill for designation or 
allowed any such facility to submit a bid to accept County 
waste."  If supported, these allegations would establish that 
out-of-state sites did not compete on a "level playing field" and 
that the process had the effect of discriminating against 
interstate commerce.  At least some of these accusations are not 
borne out by the record, however.  The County included a 
description of the Waste Advisory Committee's consideration of 
alternative sites, one of which was in Baltimore, Maryland, and 
one in Philadelphia.0 
                                                           
0Although the county's pre-existing economic interest in the 
designated landfill creates the incentive for the county to favor 
these in-state sites in violation of the dormant commerce clause, 
not every case where the county has an economic stake in the 
designated site will result in such a violation.  The county 
could, for example, have selected the designated sites in an 
open, fair and competitive process, and then made investments in 
improving those sites.  The length of the period of designation 
would, of course, have to be related to the amount of the 
investment. 
0It is not clear whether the Committee actually considered 
designating those sites or whether it was simply investigating an 
alternative method of waste disposal.  If the Committee never 
considered designating those sites, that would increase the 
impression that the process favored the in-state facilities. 
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 But other aspects of the County's process are less 
reassuring.  While the Committee met 13 times to discuss various 
aspects of the plan and evaluate the alternative waste disposal 
strategies and facilities (app 23), and while these meetings were 
supposed to be open to the public, they were advertised in only 
one small, local newspaper, the Daily Local News.  Public 
hearings to review the draft Plan were held on May 29 and 31, 
1990, but there is no reason to believe that those meetings were 
any better publicized.0  In the end, the Committee selected the 
two in-county sites that already served as the primary disposal 
sites for the County's waste.  The Pottstown facility was 
designated as an alternate only after the process was concluded 
(as the result of two letters and public comment received during 
the review and comment period).  Two factors in particular create 
the impression that parochialism rather than competition 
determined the outcome of the designation process:  (1) that 
established local businesses won the designation; and (2) that 
the Pottstown site was designated as an alternative after the 
process had concluded -- a status that appears to have been 
specially created for this situation.  
   b. Escape Valves: Amendment 
                                                           
0Of course, if the County can demonstrate on remand that the 
relevant out-of-state market participants knew about the 
designation opportunity anyway -- and perhaps word of such 
proposals travels quickly through the trade grapevine -- that 
would rebut the evidence about the lack of adequate publicity and 
tend to show that the process was open.  Similarly, if the County 
could demonstrate that the publication was a specialized trade 
journal which effectively notified the relevant market 
participants despite its relatively small circulation, that would 
also refute evidence that the bidding process was closed.   
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 The capacity to amend the Plan in order to add 
additional sites does not appear sufficiently to mitigate the 
effect of having chosen the established in-state interests.  If 
the amendment process were open and fairly liberal, it could 
conceivably save the initially discriminatory effect of "home 
cooking."  But the amendment process in Chester's Plan is quite 
constrained:  additional sites can only be designated if the 
existing facilities have insufficient capacity, are unable to 
obtain expansion permits, develop unforeseen environmental 
problems which preclude continued use of those facilities, or are 
subject to regulatory changes which affect their capacity or 
preclude their continued use.  See Chester County Selection and 
Justification of Municipal Waste Management Program § 6.3.4.  The 
prospect that an out-of-state site could gain designation through 
the amendment process is too remote to equalize the opportunity 
for out-of-state businesses, which were initially shut out, to 
participate in the local waste disposal market. 
 There were, moreover, indications that the Committee 
had no intention of designating additional facilities.  First, 
one of the Committee members wrote to the DER specifically 
requesting guidance on whether the County was "obligated to 
review each request formally" since it did "not wish to designate 
additional disposal facilities at this time."  Second, the 
Authority had covenanted in the 1990 bond indenture not to 
"construct, acquire or operate" any waste processing plants, 
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structures, facilities or properties which would compete for 
revenues with those already designated by the Authority.0 
   c.  Economic Interest 
 It also appears that Chester County may have had an 
economic motive for favoring certain in-county sites.  The County 
had purchased the Lanchester landfill through the issuance of 
$42.55 million in revenue bonds. (b.8).  The County has 
guaranteed an additional $41.5 million in Authority debt, secured 
a $9.2 million letter of credit, and committed to provide the 
Authority with an additional $9.5 million for landfill projects.  
That the flow control ordinance was not adopted until after the 
county had financed the authority's purchase of SECRA does not 
lessen its incentive to assure the Authority's revenues and 
thereby shield its exposure under the guarantee agreement.    
 Flow control certainly would be an effective means to 
achieve this end:  designation conferred on the three selected 
sites the capacity to charge 200-300% of the prevailing tipping 
fees at alternative sites.  Lanchester charged $57 per ton and 
SECCRA charged $52 per ton.  The Baltimore facility, by contrast, 
charged only $34 per ton.  Furthermore, the legislative history 
of the flow control scheme suggests that this financial pressure 
did indeed play a role.  The County's Administrative Agreement 
with the Authority also reflects this pressure.  In that 
                                                           
0Despite this documentary evidence indicating that there was 
little chance of an amendment, Chester County's counsel 
represented at oral argument that the county would consider 
amending the Plan to designate any facility that submitted a 
suitable bid.  The district court will want to probe these 
conflicting indications on remand. 
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agreement, the County committed "not to adopt a new Plan or to 
amend the existing plan in such a manner as to reduce the 
existing service area of the Authority or to narrow the 
definition of municipal waste directed to the Authority, [the 
owner of the SECCRA facility]." SA 373, §6(a) [Amended and 
Restated Administrative Agreement].   
 The need to protect the county's financial interests 
thus appears to have played a role in the county's decision to 
adopt flow control.  In this respect, this case closely resembles 
Carbone, where the Supreme Court found discriminatory 
Clarkstown's "avowed purpose . . . [of] retain[ing] the 
processing fees charged at the transfer station to amortize the 
cost of the facility." 104 S. Ct. at 1680. 
  3.  Summary 
 While the Act requires a fair, open and competitive 
process, and while the Committee did consider at least one out-
of-state and several out-of-county sites, it appears that Chester 
County's designation process did not afford other sites, 
including out-of-state sites, a level playing field.  Because, 
for the many reasons stated, the process appears to have been 
biased in favor of the Lanchester, SECCRA and Pottstown 
facilities, the Plan and its implementing ordinances might have 
the effect of discriminating against interstate commerce. 
Nevertheless, because the district court did not have the benefit 
of Atlantic Coast or of the clarifications we offer today, we 
will remand so that the district could may consider Chester 
County's flow control scheme in light of these principles.  We 
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therefore reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
 B.  TRI-COUNTY INDUSTRIES, INC. V. COUNTY OF MERCER 
 The district court in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania found that the Mercer County flow control scheme 
enacted pursuant to the Act discriminated against interstate 
commerce and granted injunctive relief in favor of the 
plaintiff/hauler.  The district court opined:  "It is the 
designation of a single, in-state landfill, rather than the 
process by which it was designated, that has resulted in the 
discrimination against interstate commerce."  This conclusion is 
at odds with our conclusion that the focus should be on the 
designation process, on the reasonableness of the duration of the 
designation and on the practical likelihood of an amendment to 
designate an out-of-state facility. 
 Despite the erroneous legal standard used by the 
district court, we could affirm its decision if it appeared that 
these aspects of Mercer County's flow control scheme 
discriminated against interstate commerce.  But we are not 
convinced that the facts in the record can establish either that 
Mercer County's designation process was truly discriminatory, 
that the contractual tipping fee was unreasonable at the time the 
site was selected, or that there was insufficient likelihood of 
amendment to show that the scheme discriminated against out-of-
state bidders.  For these reasons, and those explained infra, we 
must reverse and remand for further development of these aspects 
in order to gauge the real extent of the opportunity enjoyed by 
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out-of-state providers to participate in the Mercer County waste 
disposal market. 
 The Mercer County scheme resulted in the designation of 
a single site.  Although the designated site is not located 
within Mercer County, it is in Pennsylvania.  It is possible that 
the site's selection resulted from in-state prejudice.  Because 
Carbone rejected the argument that a statute had to favor all in-
state interests as a group in order to be discriminatory, the 
fact that Mercer's scheme allegedly favors only a single in-state 
site does not preclude a Commerce Clause challenge. Nevertheless, 
that only one in-state site has been selected under the county's 
designation process provides less evidence that the process has a 
discriminatory effect -- that is, that the process tends to 
select in-state sites -- than if a greater number of in-state 
sites had been selected in the designation process.  
 As with Harvey, the flow cr Discriminatory Effect 
 We still must directly address the question whether the 
selection criteria have the effect, irrespective of the County's 
intent or its economic interests, of favoring in-state interests. 
We emphasize that this case does not involve facial discrimina-
tion:  the designation process set objective criteria to choose 
the facility.  Moreover, the RFP requirements appmpt to open its 
designation process to out-of-state sites. Unlike Atlantic Coast, 
where the scheme had the explicit goal of securing in-state 
disposal capacity, Mercer County officials testified that no 
preference was given to in-state or out-of-state facilities.  And 
unlike Chester County, the county prepared detailed bid 
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specifications and advertised its RFP nationwide. Twenty three 
companies purchased the RFP package, including companies from 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, New York, Maryland, New Jersey, Minnesota and 
Louisiana.  Only four companies submitted bids in response to the 
RFP, and they all had landfills in Pennsylvania.  The appellee, 
Tri-County, was among the four which submitted bids.  As the 
district court acknowledged: 
"[T]he failure of the Authority to designate 
an out-of-state disposal facility was not the 
result of discrimination.  Rather, it was 
attributable to the failure of any out-of-
state disposal facility to bid on the 
contract, and the evidence clearly 
established that the procedures followed by 
the Authority in selecting a disposal site 
were "fair, open and competitive," as 
required by Act 101.  
 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 13. (citation omitted).  These facts certainly 
suggest that the process was fair, open, and competitive. 
Nevertheless, on remand Tri-County may be able to identify 
specifications of the bid or decisional criteria with a 
discriminatory effect. 
  2.  Lack of Economic Interest 
 Because the county had a relatively small economic 
interest in the facilities economic performance (it received a $1 
per ton surcharge on the waste dumped at the facility), the 
district court concluded that the ordinance did not foster 
economic protectionism.  As we have seen, and as the district 
court recognized, that the ordinance serves legitimate local 
purposes,  does not save Mercer County's flow control scheme if 
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it has the effect of favoring in-state interests.  But the 
relative lack of economic interest refutes at least one basis for 
the argument that the designation process did not really offer a 
level playing field to out-of-state competitors. 
  3.  Potential for Discriminatory Effect 
 We still must directly address the question whether the 
selection criteria have the effect, irrespective of the County's 
intent or its economic interests, of favoring in-state interests. 
We emphasize that this case does not involve facial discrimina-
tion:  the designation process set objective criteria to choose 
the facility.  Moreover, the RFP requirements applied equally to 
all disposal facilities, irrespective of their location.  While 
this provision appears to rule out special dispensations for in-
state sites, it does not preclude the possibility that some of 
the requirements were in practice more burdensome for out-of-
state interests.  That a number of out of state companies 
requested the RFP package but that not a single out-of-state 
interest submitted a bid raises the concern that some aspect of 
the RFP discouraged out of state interests. 
 We recognize, of course, that there was a considerable 
attrition rate in this process overall, which may indicate that 
Mercer County's business was not terribly attractive to any 
landfill operator.  Indeed, of the twenty-three companies (in- or 
out-of-state) who requested the package, only four submitted a 
bid.  On this record, however, it is impossible to determine 
whether the bid requirements had -- or would tend to have -- a 
disparate effect on out-of-state businesses.  On remand, the 
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district court might consider statistical or other evidence 
regarding the differential drop out rates of firms in this 
contested designation process and/or expert testimony on the 
issue whether any specific RFP requirement was in fact more 
costly or burdensome for an out-of-state site to comply with. 
  4.  Amendment 
 It is important to note that Mercer's scheme would be 
less problematic if a realistic opportunity existed for an out-
of-state landfill to compete for at least some of the county's 
business within a reasonable period, either because amendment to 
designate an additional site was more likely or because the 
contract period was not so long.  Although the County did have 
the capacity to amend its Plan to designate an additional site0, 
the County conceded that it probably did not have enough waste to 
justify adding another facility, especially since the county had 
been advised that it would be most efficient for it to use a 
single site. Dist. Ct. Op., Add. 32-33.  The designation of the 
site in this case, therefore, effectively amounts to the grant of 
a monopoly for the period of the designation.  Because the Act 
required the counties to secure ten-year access to disposal 
capacity, we will not attribute a discriminatory motive to the 
county's effective grant of a ten-year monopoly in this case.0 
                                                           
0Section 3 of the Ordinance No. 6-1991 provides:  "All Municipal 
Waste shall be transported to and delivered to the Facility 
designated by MCSWA from time to time. . . ." 
0Although we do not infer a discriminatory purpose from the 
length of the contractual period, we concede that this would be 
an easier case if the losers in the designation process were not 
precluded from the local market for ten years.  Nevertheless, we 
cannot say, given the costs of constructing and operating 
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  5.  Economic Favoritism 
 The possibility still exists, however, that the county 
contracted for a tipping fee that was so high relative to the 
ten-year tipping fees (the rate that the parties would be willing 
to fix for the entire period) prevailing in the market at the 
time of contracting that it would suggest an attempt to confer 
some extraordinary, super-monopolistic profit on the chosen 
landfill operator.  It is not clear whether, in addition to 
securing ten-year disposal capacity, the Act required the County 
to lock in a price as well.  Regardless, we would not infer any 
discrimination from the County's desire to lock in the price 
unless it turns out that the price was unreasonable at the time 
the site was selected.  Although the County appears to have made 
a "bad bet" on the price of long term waste disposal,0 the market 
could just as easily have moved in the opposite direction and 
made county officials look financially savvy.0  Indeed, the 
differential between the contracted tipping fee and the spot 
market is much smaller than it is in the Harvey case: the 
contractual tipping fee was $35 per ton relative to the spot 
rates of $17.20 at the American Waste Landfill or the $27.95 due 
at the Carbon Limestone Landfill. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
environmentally sound facilities, that the ten-year period was 
unreasonable. 
0Spot market tipping fees, fees charged to dump waste today only, 
have declined precipitously since the County made its contract 
with the facility in Butler County.  Spot rates currently are 
apparently approximately $17.50 - $30.00 per ton. 
0County officials apparently chose to lock in the tipping fee out 
of their concern that tipping fees would continue to escalate.  
See dist. ct. adjudication. 
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 Appellees devote considerable effort to their attempts 
to demonstrate the less restrictive alternative means of ensuring 
long term environmentally safe waste disposal capacity.  We do 
not pass on the efficacy of these alternative strategies.  If the 
district court decides on remand that the Mercer County 
designation scheme has the effect of discriminating against out-
of-state interests, it must then under the strict scrutiny 
standard address both the question whether the government 
interest is strong enough and whether less discriminatory means 
to achieve the same goal are available. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the orders of 
the district courts in these two cases, and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  Parties to bear their 
own costs. 
____________________________ 
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Harvey v. County of Chester, No. 94-1924 
Tri County v. County of Mercer, No. 94-3622 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 In each of the two cases before us in this appeal, the 
majority reverses the district court and remands the cause for it 
to further scrutinize the designation process.  I must 
respectfully dissent.   
 Discriminatory purpose or effect triggers heightened 
scrutiny.  The outcome of a selection process, however open that 
process may be, can be discriminatory in its practical effect. 
Regardless of the designation process employed, in each case a 
designation was made in the context of a flow control scheme; in 
each case, that flow control designation constituted an 
impermissible discrimination against interstate commerce and by 
effect alone triggered heightened scrutiny.  I would affirm the 
order in Tri-County, in which I conclude the district court 
properly applied heightened scrutiny.  I would reverse the order 
in Harvey & Harvey, and remand to the district court for it to 
apply the heightened scrutiny standard, because it failed to do 
so, despite the discriminatory effect of the designation in the 
context of flow control.  
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 The articles of commerce involved in these cases are 
both the waste itself and the disposal services it requires. 
"Solid waste, even if it has no value, is an article of 
commerce."  Fort Gratiot Landfill v. Michigan Dep't of Natural 
Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 359, 112 S.Ct. 2019, 2023 (1992). 
Although the Supreme Court in Carbone suggested that "the article 
of commerce is not so much the solid waste itself, but rather the 
service of processing and disposing of it," C & A Carbone, Inc. 
v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y.,     U.S.    , 114 S.Ct. 1677, 1682 
(1992) (emphasis supplied), the Court has not eliminated 
consideration of waste as an article of commerce.  Whether 
dealings between Pennsylvania generators of waste and out-of-
state waste disposal service companies are "viewed as 'sales' of 
garbage or 'purchases' of transportation and disposal services, 
the commercial transactions unquestionably have an interstate 
character."  Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 359, 112 S.Ct. at 2023. 
 In Carbone the Supreme Court held that a flow control 
ordinance coupled with a designation discriminated in its effect 
because it allowed only the designated operator to provide waste 
services within the geographic limits of the municipality.  In 
Carbone, the town of Clarkstown designated a single, in-state 
facility to provide initial processing services for waste; its 
designation was part of a flow control scheme, which required all 
to use the designated facility.  The court found that "[t]he 
ordinance thus deprives out-of-state businesses of access to a 
local market."  114 S.Ct. at 1681.  Likewise, in the cases before 
us, out-of-state providers of waste services cannot accept waste 
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or sell services except to the extent that waste would be 
delivered to a designated facility; flow control mandates that 
waste only be delivered to a designated facility. 
 As in the Carbone case, "the real question is whether 
the flow control ordinance is valid despite its undoubted effect 
on interstate commerce."  Id. at 1682 (emphasis supplied).0 And, 
again as in the Carbone case, "find[ing] that the ordinance 
discriminates against interstate commerce, we need not resort to 
the Pike test."  Id.   
 Thus, heightened scrutiny must be applied in the cases 
before us, because, regardless of the process employed in 
selecting waste service providers, the effect discriminates 
against interstate commerce.  The Supreme Court "interpret[s] the 
Commerce Clause to invalidate local laws that impose commercial 
barriers or discriminate against an article of commerce by reason 
of its origin or destination out of State."  Id. (emphasis 
supplied). 
 Heightened scrutiny analysis dictates that 
"[d]iscrimination against interstate commerce in favor of local 
business or investment is per se invalid, save in a narrow class 
of cases in which the municipality can demonstrate, under 
rigorous scrutiny, that it has no other means to advance a 
legitimate local interest."  Carbone, 114 S.Ct. at 1683 (citing 
                                                           
0Significantly, the Carbone court did not engage in an analysis 
of the process by which the Clarkstown facility was selected.  It 
looked only to effect. 
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Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 106 S.Ct. 2440 (1986)).0  The 
Carbone court specifically rejected the contentions of amici in 
that case that designation coupled with a flow control scheme fit 
into the narrow class of permissible discrimination.  In Carbone, 
the amici "suggest[ed] that as landfill space diminishes and 
environmental cleanup costs escalate, measures like flow control 
become necessary to ensure the safe handling and proper treatment 
of solid waste.  The teaching of our cases is that these 
arguments must be rejected absent the clearest showing that the 
unobstructed flow of interstate commerce itself is unable to 
solve the local problem."  114 S.Ct. at 1683. 
 Although assurance of ten years of disposal capacity 
for county waste and of the proper disposal of waste generated in 
a county are laudable goals, the designation of facilities under 
a flow control scheme may not be essential for the achievement of 
those goals.  For example, the county might receive assurances of 
ten years of capacity from a few disposal facilities without then 
requiring all county-generated waste actually to be disposed of 
at those same specific facilities.  The goal of providing ten 
years of disposal capacity need not require that each facility, 
to accept waste, must provide an assurance of ten years of 
capacity.0  Like the municipality in Carbone, the county in each 
                                                           
0Once "shown to discriminate against interstate commerce either 
on its face or in practical effect, the burden falls on the State 
to demonstrate both that the statute serves a legitimate local 
purpose, and that this purpose could not be served as well by 
available nondiscriminatory means."  Maine, 477 U.S. at 138, 106 
S.Ct. at 2447 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
0To the extent that the county might be providing an exclusive 
franchise to accept waste as payment in exchange for the 
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of the cases before us has open to it "any number of 
nondiscriminatory alternatives for addressing the . . . problems 
alleged to justify the ordinance in question."  Id. 
 As the holding of the Supreme Court in Carbone compels, 
the Tri-County district court applied the heightened scrutiny 
test upon finding that the Mercer County ordinance was 
discriminatory in its practical effect.  The district court ruled 
in favor of Tri-County Industries, Inc., because the defendants 
failed to meet their burden of demonstrating the unavailability 
of nondiscriminatory alternatives.  I would affirm the district 
court for the reasons it gave in its well-reasoned opinion.  The 
Harvey & Harvey district court overlooked the discriminatory 
effect of designation in a flow control scheme.  For that reason, 
it failed to require heightened scrutiny.  I would reverse its 
holding that Pike scrutiny applied, and remand.  Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S.Ct. 844, 847 (1970). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
assurance of ten years of capacity, the scheme of flow control 
coupled with designation would in essence constitute a county 
scheme to finance the capacity assurance received, providing as 
payment the granting of a monopoly and its concomitant profits 
and stability in exchange for the assurance. The permissibility 
of such an arrangement is highly doubtful.   
